Eric Lee

Problem-solving courts have generated healthy debate among both proponents and critics. Advocates of problem-solving courts hail improved case outcomes, including reductions in crime, increased sobriety for addicts, safer neighborhoods, fewer probation violations, and enhanced public confidence in justice. Skeptics question whether the new courts are engaged in practices—including monitoring defendants in treatment, listening to community concerns, and forging collaborations with government and non-profit agencies to solve discrete problems—that are inconsistent with the traditional values of the judicial branch. What is so new about what judges are doing in problem-solving courts? In late 1999, a select group of judges, attorneys, policy makers, and scholars gathered to answer this and other questions. The panel was the first in a series of discussions about problem-solving courts sponsored by the Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice, the Open Society Institute (Program in Law and Society), and the Center for Court Innovation. What follows is an edited transcript of this part of the conversation. For the entire transcript, click here. Moderator Eric Lane, Eric J. Schmertz Professor of Public Law and Public Service, Hofstra Law School: What’s so new about what judges are doing in problem-solving courts? Cindy Lederman, Administrative Judge, Juvenile Division, 11th Judicial Circuit, Florida: It seems to me that the public is now coming to the courts and asking for solutions to problems like crime, domestic violence, and substance abuse. If we as judges accept this challenge, we’re no longer the referee or the spectator. We’re a participant in the process. We’re not just looking at the offense any more. We’re looking more and more at the best interests, not just of the defendant, but of the defendant’s family and the community as well. This is quite a leap. It’s not traditional. And not every judge can or should do this. It can be a disaster to have the wrong judge sitting in a problem-solving court. It’s much more difficult than sitting in a normal courtroom. You need to read more than the law. You need a lot more courage as well, because you will be subject to tremendous criticism from your colleagues. “Are you being impartial? Do you know too much so that you can no longer be impartial?” I can’t tell you how many times I’ve heard that. Which leads me to one of my favorite quotes, which is “The judiciary is the only profession that exalts ignorance.” Judith S. Kaye, Chief Judge, New York State Court of Appeals: I’ve never understood that. I’ve been an appellate judge for more than 16 years. I’ve decided a lot of Uniform Commercial Code cases. I love the Uniform Commercial Code. I read a lot about it. Am I doing something unethical? Is the domestic violence judge who tries to make himself an informed person on the very difficult issue of domestic violence doing something unethical? Truman Morrison, III, Judge, District of Columbia Superior Court: I’m puzzled by some of the things that Judge Lederman said. I don’t understand why it is that only a few of her colleagues would be fit to be in one of these special courts. I hope that it isn’t because only a few of them share her ideological view of how you approach domestic violence or how you approach drug abuse, because if that’s true, I think that’s very, very worrisome. Michael Schrunk, District Attorney, Multnomah County, Oregon: I agree wholeheartedly that not every judge can be a problem-solving court judge. My public defender and I have to go out and recruit judges, literally, with the blessing of our presiding judge, to see if they’d be willing to do a drug court, to do a community court. We get turned down by some of my former deputies, some of my public defender’s former deputies. What we’re looking for is a proactive judge as opposed to a reactive judge, someone who can preserve the core values of the judiciary, but still be a risktaker. I think there needs to be a recognition that this is non-traditional judging, just as I tell my young lawyers fresh out of law school who want to slug felons that this is non-traditional prosecuting. And I suspect deputy public defenders find out when they serve a tour in problem-solving courts that it’s non-traditional defending, too. We’re not preparing people in law schools for this. Kaye: The suggestion is on the table that there is some sort of ideology that makes a good problem-solving judge. I thought it would be worthwhile hearing from one of the problem-solving judges. Lederman: I think there’s an ideology. There’s a personality as well. There are many judges who are reluctant to speak human to human to the people that appear before them. Those judges are inappropriate for a problem-solving court. A judge has to feel that it’s the responsibility of the judiciary to engage in this sort of work and have the personality to engage human beings from the bench. Not every judge has these characteristics. Morrison: I still don’t have a picture yet of who the ideal person for this job is. It strikes me that it ought to be a good judge—someone who is open to other people’s ideas, who listens, who is informed, who is impartial. All of us have colleagues who are brilliant and colleagues who are boors. Obviously, we don’t want bad judges in these courts. If we put aside the real bad people who probably shouldn’t be on the bench anyway, most judges could do this job, many more than do. By way of example, let me tell you about a colleague of mine on the bench. He’s actually the senior judge in our court, who everybody would define as a traditional judge, to the extent we all have a stereotype of that. Years ago, he served as the judge in our local drug court. Yesterday, he absolutely shocked me by saying that his year on the drug court was the single most meaningful experience he’s had in 22 years of being a judge. I said: “Gosh, that surprises me. Why is that?” He said: “Because in many ways I was able, with complete fidelity to all my principles, to do a better job of being a judge in that context than I ever was doing anything else.” I say this just to underline that if we’re doing this right, it shouldn’t be a tiny little fraternity and sorority of select jurists who are up to the task. Judy Harris Kluger, Administrative Judge, New York City Criminal Court: I don’t think you need a particular ideology. That would be terrible. I do believe that, except for our problem judges, most judges could do this job well. In my experience, once the Midtown Community Court got started in New York, judges said: “Could I sit there?” These judges were very different, but the common denominator was they were tired of having their competence evaluated on how many arraignments they could do. You know, for a long time my claim to fame was that I arraigned 200 cases in one session. That’s ridiculous. When I was arraigning cases, I’d be handed the papers, say the sentence is going to be five days, ten days, whatever, never even looking at the defendant. At a community court, I’m able to look up from the papers and see the person standing in front of me. It takes two or three more minutes, but I think a judge is much more effective that way.

What part of defenders’ wariness about problem-solving courts stem from fears of altering their roles as zealous advocates? This is just one of the questions examined as part of a two-year exploration of problem-solving justice. Problem-solving courts encourage prosecutors and defenders to get involved in changing the behavior of offenders and ensuring the future well-being of communities. This is a significant departure from business as usual. This wave of experimentation and innovation raises some important questions for court players, and defenders in particular. What part of defenders’ wariness about problem-solving courts stem from fears of altering their roles as zealous advocates? This is just one of the questions examined by the U.S. Department of Justice’s Office of Justice Programs, the Open Society Institute, and the Center for Court Innovation as part of a two-year exploration of problem-solving justice. What follows is an excerpt from a transcript from a roundtable discussion held in March 2000 in Washington, D.C. For the complete transcript, click here. Francis X. Hartmann, Executive Director, Program in Criminal Justice Policy, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University: What part of defenders’ wariness about problem-solving courts comes from fears of altering their roles as zealous advocates? James R. Neuhard, Director, State Appellate Defender’s Office, Detroit, Michigan: The fear I have is losing the ability to say the emperor has no clothes. I think what I hear coming from the defense bar isn’t that these problem-solving courts are a bad idea. I’m not opposed to the idea of having more alternatives for my clients. The thing I find regretful about problem-solving courts is that we have to somehow give up our traditional role in order to make problem-solving courts work effectively. My question about problem-solving courts is why do we have to change anything about what we do? Robert Weisberg, Edwin E. Huddleson Jr. Professor of Law, Stanford Law School: If defenders’ ethical obligation is limited to “Protect your clients to the maximum extent possible from state coercion,” then what’s attractive about problem-solving courts and the alternatives they offer? When we talked about effective lawyering, we spoke about defense lawyers’ also attaching ethical importance to improving their clients’ lives. Then the question becomes: Are problem-solving courts a good means to fulfill that goal? Just as a little thought experiment, let’s imagine state coercion did not exist. What would be the nature of your ethical obligation to your client? What principles would guide you as you advised your client about the available alternatives to incarceration? Would you use your persuasive powers to the maximum extent possible to get your client into drug rehab, into the mental health system, or into other so-called service systems? Kim Taylor-Thompson, Professor of Clinical Law, New York University School of Law: If you’re asking whether I would advise somebody who has jumped a turnstile to go into the mental health system, as it now exists, then my answer would be a flat “No.” If you ask whether I would put this person in a program that somebody has investigated, that targets this defendant’s particular needs, and that gives this defendant a second chance if that type of treatment doesn’t work, then I might have a different reaction. Scott Newman, Marion County Prosecutor, Indianapolis, Indiana: I think defense lawyers want to be sure that whatever program their client is sent to has adequate resources and is sincere—not just window dressing—so that the client has a reasonable prospect of a positive outcome instead of being thrown back in jail. Michele Maxian, Attorney-in-Charge, Criminal Defense Division, The Legal Aid Society, New York City: I’d like to respond to Professor Weisberg’s question about using our persuasive powers. I never turn the full strength of my persuasive powers on my client. I don’t for two reasons. First, I have no idea what is in my client’s best interests—I’m a nice little white Midwestern girl living in New York City. Second, I believe in the dignity and individuality of my client. It isn’t that I don’t counsel them or that I don’t share my views with them. But I don’t lawyer them the same way I lawyer a judge or the same way I might lawyer a district attorney. This doesn’t mean that my responsibility towards my clients does not extend beyond the courtroom or that I’m not concerned about their lives. Cliff Keenan, Counsel on Community Prosecution, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice: I’m wondering: Is it the defense attorney’s role in a problem-solving court to basically take on social work? During a break, I asked John Stuart: “What about the cases that aren’t prosecuted, do you have an interest in that person’s problems?” And, I think John’s reply was appropriate: “No, because they’re no longer a client.” When the attorney-client relationship begins, the lawyer assumes responsibility for that client’s legal issues. What is the attorney’s obligation, if any, to address the client’s non-legal problems? Elizabeth Glazer, Chief, Crime Control Strategies, United States Attorney, Southern District of New York: It’s dangerous to say: “This is what a social service does and this is what lawyers do.” Social service and criminal justice are sort of two halves of the same coin. And if our overall goal is to reduce crime, it’s our responsibility to deal with both sides. Neuhard: Well, I think it is my responsibility to counsel clients on how to keep their life going on a path that will keep them out of prison or jail. You’re not lawyering them—you’re trying to communicate what’s in their best interest for survival. Jo-Ann Wallace, Chief Counsel, National Legal Aid and Defender Association: In my mind, attempting to convince your client to take a treatment alternative does not relax the zealousness of your advocacy for that client—whether it takes place at the plea stage or at sentencing. I would use a standard of the client’s “informed choice” to guide my ethical obligation. As a defense attorney, I’m trying to give clients as much information as possible. When the client makes an informed decision, I will then advocate for it, even if it is at odds with what I believe to be the client’s best interest. Anthony Thompson, Associate Professor of Clinical Law, New York University School of Law: I think you act as both attorney and as counselor for your client. You’re saying to the client: “You have some options here.” My understanding is that client counseling is consistent with client advocacy. You say to the client: “Look at these 20 prior convictions. Let’s talk about whether or not this 90 days in jail is what you want to do or whether you want to do 180 days in drug treatment.” Neuhard: But if your client says, “A,” can you go into court and say, “Not A” to the judge? Thompson: There are no circumstances in which you’re going to do that. Hon. Judy Harris Kluger, Administrative Judge, New York City Criminal Court: I think if you are being asked to do that, then someone is doing something very wrong. Your client should never be in the position where he or she does not want to do something and the lawyer is saying the opposite. I think you should always be zealously representing your client in the best way you know how, but it can be done within the context of other options, like treatment. John Stuart, Minnesota State Public Defender, Minneapolis, Minnesota: I worry about the effects of collaboration on zealous advocacy. In problem-solving courts, you often have the same prosecutor, the same defender, and the same judge all working together in the same court day after day. Usually, as an advocate, I can tell a certain prosecutor that there is something wrong with his case and then I might not see him again for a week. Or if a particular judge got mad at me because I was making several motions, it wouldn’t matter because I would have eight different judges to go to afterwards. I’m concerned about the impact of telling the judge, the prosecutor, and the defender that they are all in this little boat together and they have to get along out there on the ocean. That, I think, could have a deleterious effect on the zealous advocacy of the defense attorney. We always have tried to avoid “horizontal representation,” where the public defender is assigned to the courtroom rather than the client. Judge Kluger: I think that’s why it’s important to have aggressive, very capable defense attorneys in problem-solving courts. Lawyers have to be trained that you don’t stop being an advocate in problem-solving courts. I think the problem is that there isn’t enough education or training of the lawyers who are working in these courts about how to do it a little bit differently, but not with less zeal and not with anything less than the client’s best interest. Maxian: I feel more like a patient advocate than like a lawyer in a problem-solving court. Most of the significant advocacy is done during the process of setting up the court. To be an effective advocate in a problem-solving court, defenders have to be closely involved in setting it up because so much depends on what treatment is mandated and how it is monitored. Taylor-Thompson: To advocate zealously in a problem-solving court, you need real, long-term training to figure out what kinds of treatment programs actually work, what are an individual’s problems, and how to match that individual’s problem to a particular program. Defense lawyers, prosecutors, and judges are currently not trained to do this. Cait Clarke, Lecturer, Harvard University, Kennedy School of Government: The training gap could be partly addressed through teaching negotiation skills to criminal lawyers. Lawyers in problem-solving courts are largely engaged in negotiation. But nobody is teaching criminal justice negotiation skills, not one program across the country. Esther Lardent, President, Pro Bono Institute, Georgetown University Law Center: Can public defenders and prosecutors really be effective lawyers in this kind of system? Do we really think judges are the right people to decide among various treatment modalities? Glazer: My understanding of problem-solving courts is that it’s not so much the lawyers or the judges that are making these kind of treatment decisions. Rather, the lawyers and judges are relying on trained social service professionals to advise them and tell them what it is that they are seeing in front of them. Stuart: You don’t need to have a specialty certificate to be a lawyer in a problem-solving court. Lawyering in these courts is plain old sentencing advocacy. For a long time before problem-solving courts existed, the defense attorney’s function has been mostly limited to sentencing advocacy—minimizing the amount of punishment or government intrusion. It’s a rare case that you get to argue that your client is not guilty and go to trial on the merits.

In September 2005, the Bureau of Justice Assistance of the U.S. Department of Justice funded ten demonstration projects and one technical assistance provider under its new Community-Based Problem-Solving Criminal Justice Initiative. The Initiative aims to broaden the scope of problem-solving courts, testing their approach to wider defendant populations and applying key problem-solving principles—links to social services, rigorous judicial monitoring, aggressive community outreach—outside of the specialized court context.  The Center for Court Innovation was named technical assistance provider for the Initiative, and will assist the ten demonstration sites in implementing their problem-solving initiatives. These grantees are: the Pima County Juvenile Court Center, Arizona; the San Diego City Attorney's Office, California; the City of Atlanta Community Court Division, Georgia; the Sault Tribe of Chippewa Indians, Michigan; Bronx Community Solutions, New York; the Athens County Municipal Court, Ohio; Clackamas County, Oregon; the Fourth Circuit, South Carolina; the Office of the Commonwealth's Attorney, Lynchburg, Virginia; and the City of Seattle, Washington. Click on the names above to read abstracts of each winning proposal.

    The New York State Adult Drug Court Evaluation, which can be read in its entirety here, evaluates adult drug courts in New York State, one of a handful of states that is engaged in a coordinated effort to institutionalize drug courts statewide. With funding from the Bureau of Justice Assistance of the U.S. Department of Justice, the Center for Court Innovation, in collaboration with the New York State Unified Court System, spent three years documenting the policies, participant characteristics, and performance of participants in eleven of the state’s oldest and largest drug courts. Four were from large urban counties of New York City (Bronx, Brooklyn, Manhattan, and Queens); one is suburban (Suffolk); three are from medium-sized cities (Syracuse, Rochester, and Buffalo); and three were from small city/semi-rural areas (Tonawanda, Lackawanna, and Ithaca). At six of these drug courts, impact evaluations were also conducted to determine effects on recidivism as compared with conventional case processing. What follows are some of the main points researchers concluded from the evaluation. Impact on Recidivism All six drug courts (Bronx, Brooklyn, Queens, Suffolk, Syracuse, and Rochester) produced recidivism reductions compared with conventional case processing. The six courts represent a mix of geographic areas and policies (e.g., regarding eligibility criteria, screening and assessment protocols, graduation requirements, approach to sanctions, and supplemental services). Since the measurement periods tracked defendants at least three years after the initial arrest and at least one year after program completion, the results indicate that positive drug court impacts are durable over time. The six drug courts generated an average 29% recidivism reduction over the three-year post-arrest period and an average 32% reduction over the one-year post-program period. Major findings are as follows: Reduced post-arrest recidivism: Drug court participation led to a lower probability of recidivism three years after the initial arrest (significant in five courts and p < .10 in the sixth). Depending on the drug court, recidivism reductions ranged from 13% to 47% (average reduction = 29%) relative to the comparison group level. Reduced post-program recidivism: Drug court impacts extended beyond the period of program participation. Drug court participation led to a lower probability of recidivism at one year post-program (significant in three courts, p < .10 in one court, and suggested by the numbers but not significant in two). Post-program recidivism reductions ranged from 19% to 52% (average reduction = 32%). Survival over time: When comparing in-program to post-program recidivism rates for drug court participants, recidivism did not rise in the post-program period, but rather declined in three of the six courts. Further, when comparing participant and comparison group recidivism rates after each additional year following the initial arrest (a “survival analysis”), in only one of the six courts was there clear evidence of attenuation of the drug court impact over time. This was contrary to the expectation that the magnitude of the drug court impact would peak immediately following the arrest (when judicial monitoring is most intensive); instead, results in most sites revealed positive long-term impacts persisting beyond the period of active judicial supervision. Impact of drug court graduation: Drug court graduates were far less likely than comparison defendants to recidivate in all six courts; however, drug court failures were as likely, if not more so, as comparison defendants to recidivate in four of the six courts. Translation: the benefits of drug court participation largely accrue to those who successfully graduate. Impact of arrest charge: In Rochester, participants arrested on drug charges performed better relative to the comparison group than participants arrested on a select number of non-drug charges. Although the analysis is relatively limited in scope and requires future replication, the findings suggest that drug courts may be more successful in curtailing drug-based criminal behavior (indicated by drug charges) than in curtailing criminal behavior driven by other criminal propensities. Other predictors of recidivism: Among drug court participants and comparison defendants alike, those with prior misdemeanor convictions and of younger age were generally more likely than others to recidivate across all courts and analyses. Impact on Case Processing and Case Outcomes For the same six sites, the impacts of drug courts on criminal case processing and case outcomes were analyzed. Key findings include: Initial case processing speed: Drug court cases reach initial disposition more quickly than conventional court cases. Participants in all six drug courts spent significantly less time from arrest to initial disposition/program entry than comparison defendants. Total Time Pending: When in-program participation time was included in the calculation, processing time for participants was far longer than for comparison defendants (due to the length of the drug court program). Hence to achieve positive impacts such as lower recidivism, drug courts require a significant up-front investment of court resources. Sentencing: Average sentence length stemming from the initial criminal case is sometimes shorter than in conventional prosecution—and sometimes not. Whereas graduates are never sent to jail or prison, drug court failures receive longer incarceration sentences than comparison defendants in five of the six courts. This highlights the importance of drug court graduation in reducing the use of incarceration. When considering initial case outcomes for all participants at once (combining graduates and failures), drug court participants averaged significantly shorter jail or prison sentences in three of six courts; but in one court, drug court participants were sentenced for significantly longer on average and in the remaining two courts, there was no significant difference. Program Retention Rates Retention is a key measure of program success. A one-year retention rate indicates the percentage of participants who, exactly one year after entering drug court, had either graduated or remained active in the drug court program. Earlier research finds that retention not only indicates success in treatment but also predicts future success in the form of lower post-program recidivism and drug use. Drug courts generally produce higher retention rates than community-based treatment programs accepting a combination of voluntary and court-mandated treatment participants. Key findings about program retention and graduation rates across the eleven drug courts studied here include: Retention rates: The one-year retention rate exceeds the national standard of 60% for drug courts in eight of eleven courts studied (five New York State courts exceeded 70%). Long-term retention/graduation rates: When the retention period is extended to two and three years, more than half of participants in eight of eleven New York State courts are retained—and the rate exceeds 60% in three courts. The three-year retention rate gives a close approximation of each drug court’s final graduation rate. Predictors of Success Across five drug courts (Bronx, Brooklyn, Queens, Suffolk, and Syracuse), several characteristics consistently predicted both drug court graduation and lower recidivism: Participant characteristics: Consistent with earlier studies, age predicted success; older defendants were more likely to graduate and less likely to recidivate. A primary drug of heroin made graduation less likely (in two of three courts examined for this effect) and prior criminal convictions were near universally predictive of future recidivism. Also, participants entering on property charges were somewhat more likely to return to criminal activity than those entering on drug charges. Immediacy: Immediate engagement in treatment (e.g., avoidance of early warranting) universally and strongly predicted drug court graduation. Importance of graduation: Graduation is itself a powerful predictor of avoiding post-program recidivism; those who failed drug court were far more likely to recidivate in the post-program period.5 Further, contrary to previous research with non-drug court populations, no benefit was found to spending more total time in treatment only to fail in the end. Among those who failed, more time in the drug court program (measured in four courts) or more days specifically attending treatment (measured in one court) had no impact on post-program recidivism. These results strongly point to drug court graduation as the pivotal indicator of long-term outcomes. Drug Court Policies and Participant Characteristics In considering the drug court policies and participant characteristics in eleven courts, the analysis produced four general findings: Diversity of approaches: There is no single drug court model. All eleven courts mandate community-based treatment, regular drug testing, case management visits, updates before a dedicated judge, and rewards and sanctions in response to progress or noncompliance. However, policies vary considerably across several domains—legal eligibility criteria, whether a guilty plea is required prior to entry (the pre-plea or post-plea models), approach to treatment and case management, specific sanctioning practices, graduation requirements, legal consequences of graduation (e.g., case dismissal or charge reduction), and legal consequences of failure (e.g., length of resulting jail or prison sentence). Drug use patterns: The eleven courts also treat participants with different presenting problems. The median duration of drug use ranges from eight years (Manhattan and Queens) to eighteen (Brooklyn); and while the five most common primary drugs are similar statewide (heroin, crack, cocaine, marijuana, and alcohol), they are used in different proportions in each jurisdiction. Socioeconomic disadvantage: In all eleven courts, nearly half of the participants (and a much higher percentage in several) were neither employed nor in school at intake. More than a quarter of participants were currently or formerly homeless in seven courts. Female participants: The challenges faced by female drug court participants were particularly acute (including more severe drug use, treatment histories, and socioeconomic disadvantage than males), highlighting the need for supplemental services for this population. Treatment and Recovery Major findings about the treatment and recovery process include: Treatment capacity: Despite early questions about whether there is sufficient treatment capacity in New York State to serve the increased demand for treatment generated by drug courts, so far participants have been able to enter treatment rapidly. The median time from drug court intake to treatment placement is less than one month in eight of nine courts examined and less than ten days in three courts. Treatment modality: Over half of participants begin in an outpatient modality, in all but two courts. When clinically feasible, most courts prefer to begin participants in outpatient treatment and then upgrade to inpatient in response to relapses or other compliance problems. Characteristics generally indicating a higher probability of inpatient care are primary drug of choice (heroin), living situation (homeless), employment status (unemployed) and age (younger defendants). Relapse: Relapse and noncompliance are common, even among those who ultimately succeed. In seven of eight courts examined, at least half of all graduates had at least one positive drug test, and many had several positives—usually in the earlier stages of participation. This highlights the value of drug courts according multiple chances to participants experiencing early problems. Graduated sanctions: In responding to noncompliance, drug courts apply sanctions, such as writing an essay, observing drug court for several days from the jury box, more frequent court appearances or case management visits, community service, or short jail stays. However, drug courts vary widely in the type and severity of sanctions most frequently used. Across three courts examined in depth (Brooklyn, Queens, and Suffolk), none routinely follow a “graduated sanctions” model, where successive infractions are met with increasingly severe sanctions. Instead, some infractions are always met with a similar sanction response. For example, a warrant or new arrest in Brooklyn nearly always incurs a jail sanction. Also, drug court teams frequently make individualized decisions based on what they believe will be most effective with a particular participant rather than adhering to a rigid schedule of graduated sanctions. Achievements beyond substance abuse recovery: Beyond substance abuse recovery, drug courts seek to promote further achievements and lifestyle changes in the areas of employment, education, vocational training, housing, and family reunification. Consistent with these goals, across all nine courts examined, graduates were significantly more likely to be employed at graduation than intake. Also, graduates in five of the nine courts were significantly more likely to be in school at graduation than intake. Conclusion This study provides strong evidence that drug courts produce lasting changes in their participants, persisting even after the period of active judicial supervision. In general, the study reveals impacts consistent with those detected in other evaluations that covered shorter timeframes and fewer courts. This study also finds that final program status is a critical predictor of subsequent outcomes. Drug court graduates had far lower recidivism rates than comparable defendants not entering the drug court, while drug court failures had similar or, in some courts, higher recidivism rates than the comparison group. Accordingly, future research should seek to pinpoint which policies and practices can help drug courts produce both more graduates and lower recidivism rates. With drug courts demonstrating considerable diversity in their geography, policies, and practices, the next generation of studies should seek to answer why drug courts work and how they can produce positive outcomes for more of their participants.